Abstract-The growing number of IT services in distributed systems is directly related to the security and privacy of personal data. User-centric federated identity management (FIM) attends to the privacy issue by enabling users to approve each data dissemination between the providers of identity-related infor mation, so-called identity providers (IdPs), and the consumers of this information, the service providers (SPs). Furthermore, user-centric FIM tries to improve security and usability by providing users with a consistent digital-identity experience using so-called information cards (InfoCards). The InfoCard-based approach can help to improve usability, privacy and security, however, the approach is limited to front-channel communication In this paper we demonstrate the practicality of the approach in a real-world scenario by providing a performance evaluation conducted on a prototypical implementation.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the growing number of IT services in distributed systems, privacy and security of personal data is gaining in importance. In addition, usability is becoming a crucial asset as users have to be able to keep track of which personal data is retained by which service. The user-centric federated identity management (FIM) strives to improve privacy by "empowering human beings to control their identities" [4] .
A major characteristic of this "user empowerment" is that a user is enabled to use multiple identity providers (IdP), each managing a part of her identity-related information, namely attributes. The users may even be allowed to manage some attributes by themselves at so-called self-hosted IdPs. To ensure usability, user-centric FIM introduces so called infor mation cards (InfoCards). InfoCards are representations for a collection of user attributes issued by the IdPs providing users with a consistent digital user experience. In real-world analogy these cards are used via wallet-like graphical user interfaces called identity selectors. Concerning security, InfoCard-based systems, for example, effectively counter phishing attacks.
As demonstrated in [3] user attributes are typically stored redundantly in the InfoCard-based approach, therefore, raising consistency issues [2] . However, in consideration of con sistency, the InfoCard-based approach suffers from certain drawbacks. First of all, current InfoCard-based systems only support front-channel communication, i.e., all cOlmnunication between an IdP and SPs has to pass the user client as this component enables the user to approve the data exchange [6] .
A back-channel communication, i.e., a direct communication between IdP and SPs without involving the user client is not considered, as this carries with it the danger of an unauthorized attribute dissemination [6] . In other words, if the user is offline, data exchange is not possible. However, scenarios exist in which an IdP might want to inform SPs about certain changes of user attributes, in particular, when these changes are directly related to service authorization, such as a deactivation of a user (cp. [5] ). If these changes cannot be cOlmnunicated, this might lead to an unauthorized and incorrect service delivery. Another limitation of current InfoCard-based systems is that a user is not able to select multiple cards in a single transaction, e.g., to combine access control relevant attributes.
In summary, we argue that the InfoCard-based approach can help to improve security, privacy and usability in distributed IT systems, but needs to be enhanced. Therefore we introduced an approach called User-Controlled Automated Identity Dele gation (UCAlD) in [3] . To demonstrate the practicality of the approach in a real-world IdM system, we provide a qualitative and quantitative evaluation in this paper. The performance evaluation conducted on a prototypical implementation based on Windows CardS pace shows acceptable response times. The paper is structured as follows: In Section II we provide a brief summary of VCAID. A qualitative evaluation is pre sented in Section III, followed by a performance evaluation in Section IV. Section V concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
VCAID provides the basis for a privacy-preserving back channel communication in InfoCard-based systems. The ap proach introduces an additional party called Identity Delegate that acts on behalf of the user when services want to retrieve attributes, in particular, when the user is offline. Thereby, the delegate ensures two major aspects of user centricity: first, the delegate acts on behalf of the user in consideration of the user approval process by applying user-defined policies when a service wants to retrieve information, and second, the delegate acts in place of the user client in the attribute flow, i.e., instead of passing through the user client, the attribute flow passes through the delegate. VCAID does not require manual user interaction for the approval, instead, user approval is achieved by enabling the user to define policies, based on which the delegate is able to automate user approval, therefore, achieving a privacy-preserving back-channel communication.
The user trusts in the delegate to retrieve and disseminate attributes according to her policies I. However, according to the principle of least privilege, the delegate is only assigned restricted permissions. Therefore, an arbitrary access to user attributes is avoided, so the required amount of trust in the delegate is reduced. In particular, the concept assumes that IdPs are trusted to be configured to issue only attributes to the delegate that have already been encrypted and signed for requesting SPs. As FIM in general requires users and SPs to trust in IdPs, this is not increasing required trust. Therefore, the delegate acts as "identity relay" [1] that only gathers and forwards attributes and does not store attributes locally. Hence, an attacker taking control of the delegate is not able to read, store or alter user attributes.
Using the delegate involves different possibly recurring steps. In the preparation step, the delegate, designed as a service provided by a third party, has to be prepared by the operator to be usable for the user. The next step, named registration step, enables the user to introduce her IdPs to the delegate. In the authorization step, the user authorizes an SP to retrieve attributes through the delegate by specifying SP specific attribute retrieval policies. More SPs can be authorized by repeating this step. Essential for achieving back-channel communication is the last step, named update step, where the SP requests attributes from the delegate without requiring any manual user interaction.
III. QUALITATIVE EVALUATION
In the following, we qualitatively evaluate how the central ideas of user centricity -usability and privacy -have been addressed by UCAID.
A. Usability
The user is able to delegate the task of controlling disclosure of attributes in her absence to the Identity Delegate, thereby instructing the delegate to automatically control each data dissemination. This procedure saves the user a manual dissem ination of attribute changes. An automatic control of attribute dissemination is achieved through dissemination policies, en abling the user to control which provider is able to retrieve which attributes from which IdPs. Based on the dissemination policies, the Identity Delegate provides a central point for the user to keep track of the dissemination of her attributes.
In addition, both the authorization of an SP and federating identities are performed by reusing the underlying mechanisms of the information card system, thus, the user authorizes services and federates identities by using the identity selector.
Therefore, UCAID provide a consistent and uniform user experience.
I As a basis of a qualitative privacy evaluation, we provide a complete trust model in Section Ill. • The Identity Delegate is trusted to enforce the dissemi nation policy exactly as specified by the user.
• The Identity Delegate is trusted to perform the lookup of linking information correctly, i.e., all tokens sent to an SP refer to the user for which the SP requested attributes.
In the following, we shortly summarize the security mecha nisms leveraged by UCAID. The confidentiality and integrity of each data exchange in UCAID is protected by transport security, e.g., by TLS. Fig. 1 illustrates the registration step.
In this step, the user first authenticates against the delegate via web browser, e.g., using username/password or client certificate authentication. Thereafter, she authenticates against one or more IdPs by means of the Identity Selector (2), so phishing attacks are mitigated. Furthermore, the unidirectional identifier created by the IdP is encrypted and signed (3), thus, neither user nor delegate are able to tamper with the identifier.
To prevent phishing attacks in the authorization step, the user authenticates to the delegate via the Identity Selector. The unidirectional identifier generated by the delegate for the SP is protected by aSYlmnetric encryption to preserve confidentiality. Fig. 2 depicts the update step. In this step, SPs and the delegate typically authenticate using client certificates (1 and 2). The IdPs sign user attributes and encyrpt them with the public key of the SP before sending them to the delegate (3), so the delegate is neither able to read nor to alter the attributes.
Acting on the trust assumptions and security mechanisms, threats to the confidentiality, integrity and unlinkability of user identites can be identified. Third, an attacker could control the delegate and gain access to its private key. In this case, he may get access to the data the delegate holds. The attacker is not able to modify user attributes before they are sent to an SP, as attributes are signed by the IdPs, and is not able to read attributes by himself, because attributes are encrypted for the respective SP (step (3) in Fig. 2) . However, the attacker is able to forward user attributes to a collaborating SP, no matter if this SP were authorized by the user.
In summary, an attack compromising the Identity Delegate will not lead to major privacy leaks unless the attacker manages to collaborate with at least one IdP or SP.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In the following, we present performance tests conducted on the prototype to gain an indication of its practicality in a real-world scenario.
A. Testbed
Load tests have been conducted in a testbed of multiple The duration of these steps, and thereby the additional latency caused by the delegate, may be influenced by the following parameters:
• An increasing number of Identity Delegate users leads to an increase in user database size, i.e., the database in which the delegate stores linking information, authorita tive sources and other administrative information.
• The number of attributes that must be retrieved per SP request can vary.
• An increasing number of IdPs per user leads to an increasing number of IdPs from which attributes must be retrieved and aggregated for each SP request.
• Increasing the number of SPs retrieving attributes from the delegate, the number of users an SP retrieves attributes for or the rate at which an SP requests attributes all lead to an increasing delegate request rate.
To quantify the influence of these parameters on the addi tional latency, we first measured response time in a minimal setting, where each parameter was set to a minimum, so only one delegate user exists, and one SP retrieves one user at tribute provided by one IdP. Furthermore, the delegate neglects database access and holds all relevant data in main memory, as we want to abstract from database details in order to avoid influences of the database and the code to access database on the measurements. In further steps, we increase each parameter to gain an indication of the scalability of UCAID.
In the minimal setting, the Identity Delegate response time is about 50 ms, whereas IdP response time is about 20 ms.
This results in an additional latency of about 30 ms, which is mainly due to asynunetric encryption and signing.
To measure the influence of an increased delegate user database size, we changed the prototype to fetch user-related data from a database hosted by SQL Server 2005 Express Edi tion. Other data, e.g., transformation rules, were still held in main memory. Increasing the number of delegate users from 1 to 1,000,000 users resulted in the database growing from 3 MB to about 300 MB, but lead to no measurable rise in the additional latency caused by the delegate.
If the number of attributes which are requested by an SP is increased, the number of transformation rules which must be sent to the SP grows proportionally. Consequently, the size of the token that is issued by the delegate to the SP is increased.
We varied the number of attributes sent to the SP between one and ten typical attributes like name, phone number and so on, and observed no impact on the additional latency. 
-Average resp o nse t im e Iden t i t y Dele ga t e A future task is to enhance the delegate with an update functionality with respect to level of assurance aspects. Thus, the delegate could become an "identity-information control center" enabling users to keep track of which information is retained by which service and allowing them to trigger updates when their identity-related information changes.
